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A New Coalescence in the Housing 
Finance Reform Debate?
Susan Wachter, PhD, and Patricia A. McCoy, JD
Nearly eight years after their conservatorship was first announced, the GSEs 
remain in the same “temporary” arrangement that was put into place to calm  
the storms of the housing and financial crises of 2007 and 2008.
Namely, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to be 
controlled by the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
(FHFA) under the dictates of the Housing and Eco-
nomic Recovery Act of 2008.1 
Two years ago there appeared to be substantial 
forward movement in the prospects for long-term 
housing finance reform. Bipartisan legislation was put 
forth, the Johnson-Crapo bill,2 which had consider-
able support. In any event, the proposed legislation did 
not come to a floor vote. Despite this lack of resolu-
tion, leading industry groups and the Obama adminis-
tration are once again calling for Congress to put into 
place comprehensive reform.3
Impeding comprehensive reform are not just dif-
ferences about the goals of housing finance reform but 
also differences in the technical understanding of how 
the secondary markets need to be structured in order 
to accomplish the goals of a sustainable, efficient and 
equitable housing finance system. Nonetheless, there 
is consensus on a number of points important for the 
structuring of the housing finance system. An Issue 
Brief put forth last year by the Penn Wharton Public 
Policy Initiative showcased these points of consensus.4 
Beyond the continued calls for congressional 
SUMMARY
• In the wake of the stalled Johnson-Crapo bill, the overarching 
goal of housing finance reform continues to be the efficient 
provision of long-term fixed-rate mortgages to credit-worthy 
borrowers in all markets throughout the business cycle.
• This Issue Brief analyzes three newly-proposed plans for reform-
ing the U.S. housing finance system: (1) a proposal from Jim 
Parrot et al. to merge Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into a new 
government corporation; (2) Andrew Davidson’s proposal for 
mutual ownership of the GSEs by mortgage originators; and (3) an 
opposing plan from Mark Calabria, arguing against securitization 
altogether and for a return to the regime of originate-and-hold.
• Despite differences regarding implementation and governance 
philosophy, a new consensus may be emerging for reform, 
demonstrated most clearly in the first two proposals evaluated 
here, which recognize the efficiency of centralizing and concen-
trating control of the housing finance system’s infrastructure 
and credit risk. 
• Despite the important points of consensus, the new proposals 
still leave certain issues unresolved, including the potential 
for cyclicality. Still, broad support for centralized functions 
(i.e., promoting standardization, liquidity, consumer protection, 
and access to credit), as well as the organic growth of credit 
risk transfer transactions in recent years, may be important to 
reigniting the push for resolution of GSE conservatorship.
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action, there now appears to be new 
thinking on how the secondary mar-
ket needs to be structured for  
housing finance reform. Strikingly, 
this new thinking may herald coales-
cence in the housing reform debate. 
The Urban Institute has called for and 
received a number of contributions 
on rethinking the necessary compo-
nents of reform.5 This Issue Brief is 
informed by a research symposium, 
jointly sponsored by the Penn  
Wharton Public Policy Initiative 
and the Penn Institute for Urban 
Research, held in Washington, D.C., 
on June 15, 2016, for presenting and 
discussing several of these proposals.
This Issue Brief analyzes the 
potential merits and shortcomings 
of three of the new proposed plans 
seeking to restart the conversation 
on reforming the country’s housing 
finance system. In addition to the pro-
posals discussed below, this Issue Brief 
also includes a discussion of the new 
points of consensus in the debate over 
securitization reform, commentary on 
alternative solutions, and a discourse 
on unresolved issues and persistent 
unknowns. Ultimately, there is reason 
for optimism that the new proposals 
discussed here are laying the founda-
tions for bringing GSEs out of the 
limbo of the last decade.
THE PRIOR CONSENSUS FOR 
SECURITIZATION REFORM
Last year’s Issue Brief laid out four 
points of consensus included in most 
reform packages and specifically 
embodied in Johnson-Crapo.  
Those were: 
• Preservation of the to-be-
announced (TBA) market for 
trading mortgage-backed securi-
ties (MBS), given the ongoing 
political reality of long-term 
fixed-rate mortgages in the U.S.;
• Private capital in a first-loss posi-
tion to absorb downturns in the 
MBS market, with a government 
guarantee as a backstop to insure 
against catastrophic outcomes, 
paid for by borrowers through 
guarantee fees, or g-fees;
• Creation of a common securitiza-
tion platform (CSP) to provide 
enhanced transparency, liquidity, 
and oversight of credit standards;
• Specific plans for addressing 
affordable housing goals. 
New proposals go further, taking 
on key points that previously were 
sources of contention and ulti-
mately led to the stalling of GSE 
legislation in the last go-around, 
and arguably, moving the dialogue 
forward, to at least the beginnings 
of a new consensus. This new con-
sensus, at least as demonstrated most 
clearly in the two main proposals we 
focus on here, involves a recognition 
of the efficiency of centralizing and 
concentrating control of the system’s 
infrastructure and credit risk. The state 
of the debate as Johnson-Crapo was 
being considered included critical dif-
ferences in opinion on the efficacy of 
the very structure of the entities that 
Johnson-Crapo put forward to take 
over the role of the GSEs. Specifically, 
Johnson-Crapo proposed distribut-
ing the GSE functions among many 
actors and multiple firms in order to 
deliver a competitive industry. 
The new proposals appear to offer 
additional points of consensus on the 
distribution of GSE functions among 
actors and firms. This move may 
represent an important transforma-
tion, as it involves a new consensus 
on an issue that had been a critical 
point of disagreement. In short, most 
of the new proposals clearly identify 
the infrastructure role of the GSEs 
as a necessarily centralized function. 
The platform concept was put forth 
in several of the previous proposals, 
including the Hensarling bill6 and 
Johnson-Crapo, but in these new pro-
posals the concept is recognized as in 
fact the central function of the hous-
 1  Prepared Remarks of Melvin L. Watt, Director of FHFA, at the 
Bipartisan Policy Center, February 18, 2016.
 2  Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 
2014, S. 2017, 133th Cong., 2d Sess.
 3  Trey Garrison, “Stegman: White House will not consider re-
cap and release of GSEs,” Housing Wire, October 19, 2015; 
Ben Lane, “Mortgage bankers, Realtors, home builders to 
FHFA: Let Congress handle GSE reform,” Housing Wire, June 
8, 2016.
 4  Susan Wachter, “Next Steps in the Housing Finance Reform 
Saga,” Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative Issue Brief, 3:2 
(March 2015).
 5 Proposals are available at http://www.urban.org/policy-
centers/housing-finance-policy-center/projects/housing-
finance-reform-incubator.  On the single-family market, 
Moser is explicit in identifying the secondary function as a 
natural monopoly. Other proposals range from suggesting 
using the FHLBB as the base for a new secondary market 
(Pollock) to adding two Newcos to the existing GSEs, while 
allowing new entries into a heavily regulated market (Mill-
stein). 
 6  Protecting American Taxpayers and Homeownership Act of 
2013, H.R. 2767, 113th Cong.
 7  Parrott, Ranieri, Sperling, Zandi, and Zigas, “A More Promis-
ing Road to GSE Reform”, 2016.
 8  Id.
 9  Id.; “Must Government Remain a Backstop for Fannie and 
Freddie?,” Knowledge@Wharton, May 24, 2016, http://
knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/160523_the_fu-
ture_of_fanniemae_and_freddiemac-andrew-davidson/.
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ing finance securitizing entity. There is 
recognition that this “platform” is not 
efficiently provided by individual firms 
but rather as a centralized infrastruc-
ture function. 
By consolidating the purchas-
ing, pooling, master servicing, and 
risk control functions, ultimately the 
centralized infrastructure function 
enables and increases competition 
where it should occur. An equally 
important outcome is that interest 
rate risk is separated from credit risk, 
enabling the TBA market to exist and 
credit risk to be centrally controlled. 
The result of efficient provision of 
centralized functions is more competi-
tion rather than less in the system as 
a whole, although there are trade-offs. 
In the words of one key new proposal 
that advocates centralization:
    We give up some competition 
across these dimensions. How much 
is difficult to tell, as regulators 
would inevitably impose significant 
limitations on the discretion that 
they would allow private companies 
providing these functions, given 
the benefits of standardization and 
the importance of managing risk 
and consumer protection in the 
system. However, they would no 
doubt give private institutions at 
least some discretion, which would 
lead to differentiation and competi-
tion, resulting in a system that is 
in some respects more nimble and 
efficient than the one we propose, 
with more innovation in developing 
new mortgage products, servicing 
loans, and sharing credit risk. As we 
learned in the crisis, not all of that 
competition and innovation would 
be beneficial to consumers or the 
stability of the market, but surely 
much of it would.7    
Nevertheless, the authors believe 
that centralization is “worth the  
trade-off ”:
    By putting the key infrastructure 
into a government corporation, we 
level the playing field for lenders 
of all sizes to compete rather than 
become beholden to larger institu-
tions that have gained an advantage 
in times past by taking control over 
access to the secondary market. Our 
system also promotes competition 
in the secondary market across a 
wider range of sources of private 
capital, including capital markets, 
reinsurers, private mortgage insur-
ers, lenders,and other private  
entities. 8
The overarching goal of housing 
finance reform for the bulk of the new 
proposals continues to be the provid-
ing of long-term fixed-rate mortgages 
to credit-worthy borrowers in all 
markets throughout the business cycle 
in the most efficient way possible.9 
While the recognition of a need 
for centralized secondary market 
functions is core to two of the new 
proposals we focus on here and 
appears to be a part of many of the 
new proposals, there are still many 
deep differences in the options for 
housing finance reform. These include 
important issues of implementation 
and governance philosophy that are in 
contention, to which we turn below.
PROPOSAL 1: THE 
GOVERNMENT CORPORATION
A diverse group of housing finance 
and policy experts—Jim Parrott, 
Lewis Ranieri, Gene Sperling, Mark 
Zandi, and Barry Zigas—have 
proposed a new consensus-minded 
system in which Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac would cease operating as 
de facto public utilities under con-
servatorship and would merge into a 
single entity.10 This entity would take 
the form of a government corpora-
tion, which the authors have tenta-
tively named the National Mortgage 
Reinsurance Corporation (NMRC). 
They argue that a government cor-
poration has much of the flexibility 
 10  Parrott, Ranieri, Sperling, Zandi, and Zigas, “A More Promis-
ing Road to GSE Reform”, 2016.
 11  All loans would have to meet the definition of a “qualified 
mortgage” and be subject to FHFA price limits.
 12  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have had success in recent 
years with transferring mortgage credit risk to the private 
market through structured debt issuance transactions 
known as Connecticut Avenue Securities (CAS) and Struc-
tured Agency Credit Risk (STACR), respectively. While 
MBS protect investors against the credit risk of underlying 
mortgages and exposes them only to interest rate and 
prepayment risks, CAS and STACR remove that credit risk 
from the GSEs and offer it to the private market as an 
investment opportunity. The GSEs also have tested the ap-
petites of private investors for credit risk through insurance/
reinsurance transactions, front-end lender risk sharing 
transactions, and a senior subordinate security. Thus far, pri-
vate investors, including asset managers, hedge funds, and 
insurance companies (among others), have demonstrated 
their capacity and willingness to invest in non-catastrophic 
credit risk. In 2015, Fannie Mae transferred to them the risk 
on $187 billion of collateral ($5.9 billion through CAS) and 
Freddie Mac on $210 billion ($6.6 billion through STACR). 
Both enterprises surpassed FHFA risk sharing requirements. 
Today, the guarantee fees borrowers pay on GSE securitized 
mortgages are set by the Federal Housing Finance Agency 
and do not fluctuate with market conditions.
 13  Davidson, “Four Steps Forward: Streamline, Share Risk, 
Wrap, and Mutualize”, 2016.
 14  Andrew Davidson & Co., “Simplifying GSE Reform:  A Round-
NOTES 
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of a private entity without the rule-
making and compensation constraints 
imposed by Congress on government 
agencies. The NMRC would be a 
closely regulated monopoly, charged 
with “balanc[ing] broad access to 
credit with the safety and soundness 
of the mortgage market.” Although 
the authors envision the NMRC as 
free from the profit- or market share-
driven motives inherent in a stock 
corporation and the unavoidable and 
complex organizational challenges of a 
mutual, they also contemplate private 
investment in NMRC consisting of 
common equity of 3.5% and preferred 
equity of the same percentage.  
The new entity would perform 
the same core functions as the GSEs. 
It would purchase conforming loans, 
pool them, issue securities backed by 
those loans through a CSP, provide 
master servicing on the underlying 
loans, ensure compliance with afford-
able housing goals and duty-to-serve 
requirements (funded by a 10 bps 
affordability fee), and maintain a 
“cash window” to provide equal access 
to liquidity to lenders of all sizes, 
including community banks and other 
small lenders.11 But there would be 
important differences. The NMRC 
would provide an explicit guarantee 
on timely payment of principal and 
interest of its MBS, backed by the full 
faith and credit of the federal govern-
ment and funded by a 10 bps g-fee. 
It would also be required to transfer 
all non-catastrophic credit risk to the 
private market. The price of risk estab-
lished through the trading of credit-
linked notes and other credit risk 
transfer mechanisms would be passed 
on to mortgage borrowers and would 
change with market conditions.12
Finally, NMRC would be prohib-
ited from using its modest retained 
portfolio for investment purposes. In 
this proposal, the FHFA would con-
tinue to serve as the regulator for both 
the NMRC and the Federal Home 
Loan Banks (FHLBs). The FHFA 
also would establish the g-fee for the 
catastrophic risk and maintain a mort-
gage insurance fund (MIF) financed 
by those g-fees, essentially acting as 
a backstop for the housing finance 
system similar to the FDIC’s role for 
the banking system.
The proposal estimates that private 
capital will cover the first 3.5% of 
losses, with the MIF supplying an 
additional 2.5% of first-loss cover-
age. This 6% capitalization is double 
the realized GSE losses during the 
housing crisis but less than the 10% 
required under the Johnson-Crapo 
Act. The proposal lists other benefits 
to a government corporation. The 
NMRC would have the flexibility to 
scale back risk transfers if an estab-
lished crisis threshold was breached. 
This threshold would act as an effec-
tive cap on g-fees and mortgage rates. 
The improvements over the 
Johnson-Crapo Act motivating this 
proposal are appealing. Policymakers 
will appreciate that mortgage rates, 
under the assumptions laid out, are 
no higher than in the current system, 
although the rates would be more 
procyclical. The transition from GSEs 
to NMRC could be orderly, as it sim-
ply would accelerate what the FHFA 
is currently doing. And, finally, the 
government corporation could foster 
coordination vis-à-vis loan limits and 
priorities between itself and other 
government housing agencies (the 
FHA, the VA, and USDA), resulting 
in a more unified federal approach  
to housing. 
PROPOSAL 2: THE MUTUAL 
Andrew Davidson has put forward 
another proposal for housing finance 
reform.13 His proposal underscores 
the degree of consensus by track-
ing Proposal 1 in important respects. 
Like Parrott and his co-authors, 
Davidson would centralize the buying 
table Discussion,” 2015. 
 15  Calabria, “Coming Full Circle on Mortgage Finance,”2016.
 16  This would require the controversial step, however, of ex-
tending the current risk retention requirements to qualified 
mortgages.
 17  Diana Hancock and Wayne Passmore. 2016. “Macropru-
dential Mortgage-Backed Securitization: Can it Work?” In 
Principles of Housing Finance Reform, Susan M. Wachter 
and Joseph Tracy, editors. Philadelphia: University of Penn-
sylvania Press.
NOTES 
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and pooling of loans, the issuance of 
MBS, and master servicing activities 
in his new proposed entities. Building 
off of the recent credit risk transfer 
successes, Davidson’s proposal would 
establish reinsurance and credit risk-
sharing programs for up to 75% of 
risk on new GSE loans, providing 
first-loss coverage backed by high-
quality assets.14 There would also be 
a government backstop in the form 
of an explicit federal guarantee of the 
entities’ MBS, which would be closely 
regulated and akin to what Ginnie 
Mae securities currently receive. This 
guarantee would be funded by g-fees, 
while affordable housing goals would 
be funded by an affordability fee, 
both intended to cushion any losses. 
Finally, similar to Proposal 1, the new 
entities’ retained portfolios would be 
sharply reduced. 
However, the governance struc-
ture differs. This proposal puts forth 
mutual ownership of the GSEs by 
mortgage originators as an alternative 
to a government corporation. Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac each would 
be given the opportunity to convert 
themselves into mutuals, funded by 
mortgage activity and regulated by the 
FHFA. Ideally, the mutual structure 
would ensure that all profits would 
be paid out to the mutual owners in 
the form of dividends and that these 
funds would be recycled directly 
back into their mortgage businesses. 
Davidson also differs somewhat with 
Proposal 1 in that, while the national 
duty-to serve responsibility is a fed-
eral mandate, it would be up to the 
mutual to determine how to incent its 
members to implement those respon-
sibilities.  The overall responsibility is 
the same, but mutual members would 
have greater say in how to implement 
the national duty-to-serve responsibil-
ities than they would with a govern-
ment corporation.  
A third major way in which the 
Davidson proposal differs from Par-
rott et al. is by limiting the mutuals’ 
exposure for losses up to a vintage or 
cohort limit, with the government 
wrap covering any additional losses.  
This would permit the mutuals to 
survive a housing market collapse or 
other market catastrophe. Further, in 
distressed conditions where the avail-
ability of private capital is insufficient, 
the Treasury would be allowed to 
assume part of the credit risk for new 
vintages (for an unappealingly high 
but reasonable return). 
Davidson also has thoughtful 
proposals to ease the transition. If the 
two new mutuals could not coexist 
indefinitely, eventually merging into a 
single mutual sometime in the future 
(as this plan effectively bolsters a 
natural monopoly), that combination 
is not necessary immediately in order 
for Congress to move Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac out of conservator-
ship. A CSP, though desirable, also is 
not mandatory at first, especially if it 
would be too costly to implement or if 
it would slow down the transition.
The FHFA can undertake further 
streamlining measures by itself. But 
before Congress could authorize the 
government wrap or the establishment 
of a mutual structure for the GSEs, it 
must first facilitate the expansion of 
the risk sharing investor base in order 
for this proposal to work. Here David-
son goes into more specific detail than 
Proposal 1. As the Urban Institute 
has noted, demand for structured debt 
issuances is leveling off. Serious explo-
ration of credit-linked notes (CLNs) 
and other reinsurance mechanisms 
demands markets with sufficient 
investors. Davidson recommends 
several reforms, including changes to 
IRS and SEC rules to allow REITs to 
invest in GSE credit risk bonds.  He 
would also amend the bank capi-
tal treatment of credit risk transfer 
transactions and CFTC rules limiting 
the use of CLNs. In short, Davidson 
writes, “Bonds created by the GSEs 
under the regulatory oversight of the 
FHFA should not be treated like the 
subprime and [CDO] investments 
that contributed to the crisis.” David-
son would go even further in reducing 
taxpayer risk and the concentration of 
credit risk in the economy by develop-
ing risk retention and up-front risk 
sharing for originators on a pooled 
or specific basis and by establish-
ing capital rules for the mutuals that 
encourage risk sharing while address-
ing counterparty risk. 
While these proposals are similar 
in foundational ways, the governance 
set-ups differ. These differences may 
not be as important as they seem 
because Proposal 1 is flexible with the 
potential of a utility structure or of a 
mutual or in fact could have share-
holders as well. 
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: 
ORIGINATE-AND-HOLD
Mark Calabria of the Cato Institute 
offers a divergent, non-consensus 
plan for reform.15 Arguing that the 
most fundamental flaw of the hous-
ing finance system is investors’ lack 
of knowledge or concern about the 
underlying credit risk of MBS—even-
tually leading to a consolidation of 
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risk in the most leveraged sectors of 
the financial system—he advocates 
against securitization and for the 
return to the regime of originate-and-
hold that prevailed prior to 1980. 
Going forward, he proposes that 
GSE charters be converted to national 
bank charters, thus reorganizing the 
GSEs as bank holding companies 
(BHCs). The GSEs would continue to 
pool and securitize mortgages, to the 
extent the market supported this, but 
without any government guarantees 
(other than the guarantees through 
deposit insurance that depositories 
receive) but they also would be able to 
originate, collect deposits, and engage 
in other bank activities. Furthermore, 
the addition of two large BHCs into 
the financial system would increase 
competition. An obvious downside 
would be an exacerbation of the 
TBTF problem, though Calabria does 
call for greater BHC capital require-
ments. The other and salient downside 
is, as Calabria acknowledges, that the 
system likely would move towards 
short-term mortgages, such as prevail 
in Canada. The Calabria proposal is 
instructive in that it clearly lays out 
how the structure of the housing 
finance system dictates what mort-
gages are likely to be offered.  
UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND 
PERSISTENT UNKNOWNS
In all three of the proposals, there 
remains the potential for cyclicality, 
both in terms of g-fees and mort-
gage rates themselves. For instance, 
Parrott and his colleagues envision 
a crisis scenario where private inves-
tors increase their required return 
on equity from 10% to 25%, caus-
ing g-fees to rise by 53 bps. At that 
point the federal government would 
step in. An increase of this size likely 
would cause lending to contract and 
slow down the recovery. However, this 
procyclicality could be mitigated by 
counter-cyclical standards for capital 
and provisioning as well as risk reten-
tion requirements,16 posing less of a 
threat than the procyclicality inherent 
in the Johnson-Crapo Act. 
On the related subject of capital, 
the government corporation proposal 
terms its plan for total capitalization 
of 6% as adequate, on grounds that 
that level is approximately double 
the losses realized by the GSEs due 
to the crisis. However, the proposal 
fails to respond to serious critiques 
calling for higher private capitaliza-
tion of 15% or more, as discussed in 
the previous Issue Brief, which again 
suggests that the proposal underesti-
mates the potential for procyclicality. 
It also should be noted that capital 
requirements should be inverse to the 
procyclicality of the system as a whole. 
Thus, the importance of a system that 
promotes stability. 17 
Proposals 1 and 2 also tee up the 
question of the proper choice of entity. 
The mutual form is more conducive 
to efficiency. Meanwhile, mutuals face 
difficulties in raising capital and well-
known governance challenges that are 
unique to the mutual form.
None of the proposals addresses 
the possible re-emergence of a 
private-label market for non-amor-
tizing products and other non-
qualified mortgages and the resulting 
implications for moral hazard by the 
successor(s) to the GSEs. If these 
riskier loans gain headway, what 
would stop the NMRC or a mutual 
from loosening credit standards to 
preserve market share (particularly if 
leadership at FHFA was weak)? Even 
without a response from the NMRC 
or mutual, would this not destabilize 
the system? 
Similarly, all three proposals are 
silent about the opportunity that GSE 
reform affords to institute funda-
mental reforms of mortgage servicing 
practices. Among those problems, ser-
vicer compensation and loss mitiga-
tion protocols need thorough revamp-
ing going forward.
Another unresolved issue in the 
Davidson proposal concerns the 
limiting of MBS losses by cohort or 
vintage and whether such a feature is 
necessary. Grouping MBS by vintage 
theoretically confines losses to one 
year’s book of business, but it cannot 
perfectly insulate lenders from serial 
correlation and the practical creeping 
of losses across years. This brings to 
the fore the greatest unknown for the 
NMRC and mutual proposals: what 
if the federal government does need 
to intervene in the housing system 
again? 
For example, if investors suddenly 
flee the credit risk transfer market 
and a GSE successor experiences a 
run and requires a bail out, what are 
the implications, both from a political 
standpoint and in terms of moral haz-
ard? Could the flight from securitiza-
tion markets in 1998 and 2007-2008 
occur again? These questions war-
rant consideration, particularly given 
the perverse incentives toward even 
greater risk-taking going forward. 
A final unknown that needs to 
be carefully addressed is whether the 
estimates in Proposal 1 regarding 
capitalization and the NMRC’s ability 
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to raise sufficient private capital to 
cushion losses and avoid procyclicality 
are sufficient or too low, and whether 
raising the necessary funds is feasible. 
CONCLUSION
With each passing year, the “tempo-
rary” conservatorship of the GSEs 
becomes more and more untenable. 
Fortunately, over time, there appears 
to be more agreement among pro-
posals than is currently recognized, 
and increased coalescence around a 
path forward in the debate over GSE 
reform, despite several points that still 
require reconciliation. Broad agree-
ment over the need for centralized 
functions—promoting standardiza-
tion, liquidity, consumer protection, 
and access to credit—and the organic 
growth of credit risk transfer transac-
tions in recent years, may be enough 
to reignite the conversation and lead 
to a resolution of the convervatorship, 
which is needed for the long-term 
stability of the U.S. housing finance 
system.
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